University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

October 2019

The Complexity of Governance and Internal Audit Independence
Lily Bi
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Bi, Lily, "The Complexity of Governance and Internal Audit Independence" (2019). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8626

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar
Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Complexity of Governance and Internal Audit Independence

by

Lily Bi

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Business Administration
Muma College of Business
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Dahlia Robinson, Ph.D
Co-Major Professor: Janene Culumber, DBA
Chris Pantzalis, Ph.D
Robert Hammond, DBA
Mohamad Ali Hasbini, DBA

Date of Approval:
June 14, 2019

Keywords: audit committee, board, board structure, audit mandate, IIA Standards
Copyright © 2019, Lily Bi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... iv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study .............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Research Purpose and Questions .................................................................................. 5
1.3 Expected Contribution .................................................................................................. 5
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 7
2.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis ................................................................................ 7
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA........................................................ 16
3.1 Research Method ........................................................................................................ 16
3.2 Data Collection and Sampling .................................................................................... 16
3.3 Research Variables...................................................................................................... 18
3.3.1 Internal audit independence (IAI) ................................................................ 19
3.3.2 Factors potentially impacting internal audit independence ......................... 20
3.3.3 Measures of internal audit practices ............................................................ 22
3.4 Research Concept Map ............................................................................................... 23
CHAPTER FOUR: STATISTICAL ANALYSES ANS FINDINGS ........................................... 25
4.1 Data Description ......................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Factors Impacting IAI (RQ1) ...................................................................................... 26
4.3 Actual Internal Audit Practices (RQ2) ........................................................................ 36
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 40
CHAPTER SIX: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES ..................................................... 43
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 46

i

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Board structure under the three distinct governance models ......................................... 4
Figure 2. Concept map of the research questions and variables ................................................. 24
Figure 3. Theoretical map pertaining to internal audit independence......................................... 41
Figure 4. Internal audit’s position in organizations .................................................................... 44

ii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Three countries’ governance codes about internal audit independence ........................ 12
Table 2. Summary of selected sample responses ........................................................................ 18
Table 3. Survey questions and responses pertaining to internal audit independence ................. 19
Table 4. Potential factors impacting IAI and related survey questions and responses ............... 21
Table 5. Internal audit practices variables and related survey questions and responses ............. 23
Table 6. Missing data related to RQ1 Variables ......................................................................... 26
Table 7. Distribution of Internal Audit Independence ................................................................ 27
Table 8. Distribution of Internal Audit Independence by Country ............................................. 27
Table 9. Sample distribution by Audit Committee presence and board type .............................. 28
Table 10. Sample distribution by internal audit mandate and board type .................................... 28
Table 11. Sample distribution by industry and board type .......................................................... 29
Table 12. Sample distribution by industry and board type .......................................................... 30
Table 13. Comparison of Sample Organizations’ Mean based on the type of Board Structure .. 31
Table 14. Variables impacting internal audit independence ........................................................ 34
Table 15. Summary of Coefficients of IVs on DVs ..................................................................... 37

iii

ABSTRACT

Independence is a critical foundation of all internal audit functions and internal audit
services. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) sets The International Standards for
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, which requires that internal audit functions maintain
independence, and chief audit executives functionally report to the “board.” The term “board” is
interpreted differently in different countries due to the country’s governance models. The diverse
corporate governance models create different board structures and the CAE’s reporting
relationship with the board. Additionally, the lack of regulatory mandate about internal audit
created a reality that internal audit functions are positioned differently depending on
organizations. Through this research, I plan to compare the three typical corporate governance
models and investigate how each model impacts internal audit independence, and how internal
audit independence is reflected in the actual audit practices.
I utilized the data from the recent global internal audit survey and selected the five
representative countries - Austria, China, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. The criteria to evaluate
internal audit independence are drawn from the IIA’s Standards. This study reveals that internal
audit functions do not conform to the IIA's independence requirements. We conclude that the
governance factors, specifically the board structure, has a significant effect on both internal audit
independence and related audit practices. This is the first research that extends the understanding
of the impact of corporate governance on internal auditing.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study
The credibility and value derived from assurance services by auditors are grounded in the
foundation of auditors’ independence, both mind and in appearance. Researchers have examined
the auditors’ independence in the context of external auditors. (Jenny et al. 2010) In recent years,
the issues associated with the internal auditors’ independence and objectivity began to become of
the interest of researchers. (Jenny et al. 2010, and Dordevic, et al. 2017).
Internal auditors assure an organization’s governance, risk management, and internal
controls. Unlike external auditors, who are ostensibly independent of the organizations they
audit, internal auditors typically are employees of the organizations that they audit, and therefore
face internal pressures from management to change their audit findings (Chambers, 2015). For
example, the 2015 survey data from the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Research Foundation,
suggests that this kind of pressure is pervasive with more than half of chief audit executives
(CAEs, heads of internal audit functions) surveyed by the IIA reporting being directed by
management to change findings at some point in their careers. The best antidote for such
pressure is unwavering support for internal audit independence—from the board and the audit
committee. (Rittenberg and Miller, 2015)
The International Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (the Standards)
set by the IIA, require that internal auditors maintain independence and be free from conditions
that threaten their ability to fulfill their responsibilities in an unbiased manner. Internal audit
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independence ensures they have direct and unrestricted access to the board and senior
management and can conduct any audit engagements with no limitation.
With the focal point of internal audit independence being the chief audit executive’s
reporting relationship with the board, the IIA defines the board as “the highest-level governing
body charged with the responsibility to direct and/or oversee the organization’s activities and
hold senior management accountable” (The IIA, 2017, p. 21). However, the term “board” is
interpreted differently in different countries because of the variations in corporate governance.
Hence the CAE reporting relationship with the board is vastly different.
The term “corporate governance” was not used until the mid-1970s (Cheffins, 2011). The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is one of the leading
professional bodies focused on the development of corporate governance principles. The main
idea in developing these principles was that there would not necessarily be a single model of
corporate governance that is generally accepted in all countries and organizations (Boţa-Avram
and Răchişan, 2013). Further, the authors analyzed the similarities between OECD principles and
European corporate governance codes from an internal audit perspective and could not find any
similarity in the internal audit recommendations in the context of corporate governance.
Tradition, history, culture, and legal systems have created the world's diverse corporate
governance models. The three typical representations of governance models are the AngloAmerican, the Germanic, and the Japanese (Clarke, 2016). The board structure or board tiers are
described below:
•

The one-tier board model, also known as the Anglo-American model, is widely adopted in
the publicly traded companies in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. This board model is characterized by only one board of
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directors. The shareholders elect the board of directors. The primary duty of the board is to
oversee management performance on behalf of shareholders. The board is responsible for
selecting a well-qualified chief executive officer (CEO) and monitoring how the CEO works
with other management and runs the corporation on a daily basis. The board can be divided
into several committees, for example, nominating committee, compensation committee, and
audit committee. In this model, the audit committee typically oversees the organization’s
internal audit function (The US Business Roundtable, 2016).
•

The two-tier board model is widely adopted in the publicly traded companies in Germany,
Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, and is characterized by a
two-tier board structure, the supervisory board, and the management board. The supervisory
board is appointed by the shareholders at the general meeting. It is directly involved in
decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise and appoints. The supervisory board
elects, supervises and advises the management board, who is responsible for managing the
enterprise. In the ordinary course of business, the responsibilities of the management board in
a German company are similar to those of the senior executives of a U.S. company
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, 2017 and Austrian
Working Group for Corporate Governance, 2015)

•

Japanese (hybrid) model is adopted in the publicly traded companies in Japan and China.
This hybrid model has the board of directors and the audit and supervisory board, both of
which are elected by the general shareholders meeting. The board of directors sets the
direction of the company. The shareholders assign the fiduciary responsibilities to the audit
and supervisory board, whose roles and responsibilities include auditing the performance of
directors' duties and makes independent and objective decisions. The audit and supervisory
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board in Japan is also tasked by shareholders to appoint and dismiss external auditors, and
determine the remuneration of external auditor (Japan Tokyo Exchange, 2015)
Essentially, every corporate governance theory is at the core of power theory. (Licht, A.
2004) The American corporate governance scheme adheres to the interest and primacy of
shareholders. Its German and Japanese counterparts usually put more focuses and have stronger
protection for other constituencies such as staff, creditors, and non-shareholders. With the board
structure being the focal point of the corporate governance, I depict the board structures under
the three distinct governance models in the figure below (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Board structure under the three distinct governance models

Given the significant differences in the governance models, it is plausible that these
differences may affect the functioning of the internal audit function. For example, are there
differences in how the internal audit function (IAF) is positioned in the organization, whom the
chief audit executive reports to, and whether IAFs are more or less independent.
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1.2 Research Purpose and Questions
The purpose of the research is to investigate the relationship between the three
governance models and internal audit independence, factors impacting internal audit
independence, and whether and how internal audit independence is reflected in the actual
practices of internal auditing. As governance has many elements and dimensions, the focus of
this research is three governance factors: 1) the board structure – whether the organization adopts
a one-tier, two-tiers or hybrid board; 2) whether an audit committee exists in the organization;
and 3) whether internal audit function is mandated by law.
The following research questions guide the study and literature review:
•

RQ1: What are the factors that impact internal audit independence?

•

RQ2: How is the internal audit independence reflected in the actual internal audit
practice, specifically the CAE’s interactions with the board, the sufficiency of internal
audit budget, unrestricted access to company resources, the communication of risks?
As independence is at the internal audit department or function level, the unit of analysis

of this research is the internal audit function of an organization.

1.3 Expected Contribution
The internal audit role is the critical interest point for management and the board of
directors because of its strategic position. The internal audit function is to assist the organization
in achieving its goals by assessing and improving risk management efficiency and internal
control procedures. Although the IIA defines the requirement of the CAE reporting line and
internal audit independence, none of these requirements are included in laws and governance
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codes for publicly listed companies. Additionally, none of these governance codes mention the
role that boards play in internal audit independence.
There have been some academic articles on corporate governance and internal audit
independence, but the relationship between internal audit functional independence and board
structure is relatively unexplored. Understanding the factors impacting internal audit would help
organizations to better position the internal audit function to improve its independence, which
subsequently provides better services and add more value to its organization.
The diverse corporate governance models create different board structures, internal audit
positioning in an organization, and the CAE's reporting relationship with the board. The IIA has
not found a one-size-fits-all definition of "board." With each update of the Standards, the term
“board” is redefined. This research is potentially helpful to the IIA to have a better understanding
of complex governance structures and create a better definition of the term “board” and clarify
the CAE’s relationship with the board in the standards. These changes would ultimately enhance
internal audit function’s independence, and support IIA’s efforts in advocating better governance
to global regulators.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis
The research aims to investigate the complexity of governance and internal audit
independence. Over the last two decades, there has been a flood of initiatives around the world to
update and improve corporate governance. These efforts have multiplied since the global
financial crisis, reflecting a strong desire for corporate transparency, economic efficiency, and
protection of shareholders and the public interest. Countries and professional associations tend to
give their own definitions of corporate governance. Here are a few examples of corporate
governance definitions.
•

OECD (2015) put corporate governance focus on the organization’s shareholders and
stakeholders, their relationships, and the organization's structure. It indicates that corporate
governance provides the framework and structure through which the organization sets its
objectives and determines how the objectives are accomplished and how performance is
monitored.

•

Aguilera & Jackson (2003) describes the corporate governance as the interactions among
stakeholders in the decision-making process and the control of corporate assets.

•

The IIA focuses on the board and the organization's internal structure and process. It defines
“The combination of processes and structures implemented by the board to inform, direct,
manage, and monitor the activities of the organization toward the achievement of its
objectives” (The IIA, 2017, p. 25).
Unlike the IIA, other organizations and researchers focus on the external mechanism of
7

corporate governance. They review corporate governance at a macro level with a focus on its
ownership and oversight aspects and examine its external mechanism—the relationship between
shareholders or stakeholders, the board, and the corporation. The IIA’s definition of governance
is at the micro-level, with a focus on the oversight and execution aspects of governance. It
defines the internal governance mechanism—the process and structure of an organization,
involving players from the board of directors, management, and internal auditors.
Though many different definitions and focuses on corporate governance, many scholars
like Jensen and Meckling (1976) articulate that governance’s vital issue at the core is the agency
problem, which is the separation of ownership and control in contemporary public corporations.
According to the agency theory, the control obligation rests with the board, who serve as the
agents of the shareholders. In turn, as the board meets only a few times a year, it then appoints
management (as its agents), led by the CEO, to manage the daily operation of the organization.
While the external auditors provide an independent and unbiased opinion about the fairness of
the company’s financial statement, the independent internal audit function provides the board
with broader assurance. Internal audit services go beyond the review of the company's finance
and accounting; they assess the risks and controls associated with the operations. Adams (1994)
claims that in this context, the agency theory offers the foundation for explaining the
autonomous role and duties of the internal audit function.
The following is a list of concepts and definitions from the IIA’s Standards about internal
audit independence.
“1100 – Independence and Objectivity: The internal audit activity must be independent,
and internal auditors must be objective in performing their work. Independence is the freedom
from conditions that threaten the ability of the internal audit activity to carry out internal audit
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responsibilities in an unbiased manner. To achieve the degree of independence necessary to
effectively carry out the responsibilities of the internal audit activity, the chief audit executive
has direct and unrestricted access to senior management and the board. This can be achieved
through a dual reporting relationship. Threats to independence must be managed at the individual
auditor, engagement, functional, and organizational levels.
1110 – Organizational Independence: The chief audit executive must report to a level
within the organization that allows the internal audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities. The
chief audit executive must confirm to the board, at least annually, the organizational
independence of the internal audit activity. Organizational independence is effectively achieved
when the chief audit executive reports functionally to the board. Examples of functional
reporting to the board involve the board:
•

Approving the internal audit charter.

•

Approving the risk-based internal audit plan.

•

Approving the internal audit budget and resource plan.

•

Receiving communications from the chief audit executive on the internal audit
activity’s performance relative to its plan and other matters.

•

Approving decisions regarding the appointment and removal of the chief audit
executive.

•

Approving the remuneration of the chief audit executive.

•

Making appropriate inquiries of management and the chief audit executive to
determine whether there are inappropriate scope or resource limitations.
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1110.A1 – The internal audit activity must be free from interference in determining the
scope of internal auditing, performing work, and communicating results. The chief audit
executive must disclose such interference to the board and discuss the implications.
1111 – Direct Interaction with the Board: The chief audit executive must communicate
and interact directly with the board.” (The IIA, 2017, p. 3 to 4)
I began by reviewing the various Company Acts or Governance Codes to determine how
these IIA Standards are incorporated. As the research focus is on the three representative
governance models, we examined the US, German and Japanese corporate governance codes and
found that internal audit is rarely mentioned in these codes, and the majority of the internal audit
independence requirements promulgated by the IIA Standards are largely ignored.
In the United States, there is no corporate governance code. The state corporate laws and
federal securities laws, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, serve as the primary
regulatory sources relating to corporate governance. The US Business Roundtable has been the
leader in setting the principles of corporate governance for the US public companies. It
suggested that the audit committee plays oversight roles of the internal audit function, including
the hiring and firing the senior internal audit executive and annual evaluation of the internal audit
function’s efficiency and efficiency. The audit committee ensures appropriate funds and support
for the internal audit staff to fulfill their responsibilities, review the scope of the internal audit
plan, significant findings from the internal audit function and responses to these findings from
the management. (The US Business Roundtable, 2016).
In Germany, the Supervisory Board shall establish an audit committee, whose
responsibilities include oversight of the effectiveness of the risk management system and internal
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control processes, the internal audit and compliance function (Regierungskommission Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex, 2017).
In Japan, the board and Audit & Supervisory Board needs to ensure adequate
coordination with internal audit function, external auditors, and outside directors. (Japan Tokyo
Stock Exchange, 2015)
As these governance codes are silent on the CAE’s reporting relationship with the board
or audit committee, organizations have the freedom to decide the position of the CAEs and
internal audit functions. In the exam of European countries, too few nations (only 9 out of 27)
provide explicitly adequate information in their regulations about the internal audit independence
(Boţa-Avram and Răchişan 2013).
It is unrealistic, unfounded, and unimaginative to believe that all nations will embrace the
same corporate governance framework (Clarke, 2016). The fundamental features of different
corporate governance are likely to be continued. The OECD, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other international agencies acknowledged
the presence of distinct governance systems and proposed that they would not want to embrace a
one-size-fits-all strategy because various systems are better at serving different things. As the
research focus is on the three representative governance models, I examined the US, German,
and Japanese corporate governance codes. Internal audit is rarely mentioned in these codes,
seven times in the US governance code, only once in the German governance code and twice in
the Japan governance code. The table below shows that the majority of the internal audit
independence requirements promulgated by the IIA Standards are ignored in these governance
codes (See Table 1).
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Table 1. Three countries’ governance codes about internal audit independence
Governance Code
Independence requirements per the IIA Standards
US

Germany

Japan

Organizational independence is effectively achieved when the CAE reports
functionally to the board.
The CAE has direct and unrestricted access to senior management and the
board.
The board approves the internal audit charter.
The board approves the risk-based internal audit plan.

Yes

Examples of functional reporting to the board involve the board:
•

Approving the internal audit budget and resource plan.

Partial

•

Receiving communications from the chief audit executive on the
internal audit activity’s performance relative to its plan and other
matters.

Yes

•

Approving decisions regarding the appointment and removal of the
chief audit executive.

Yes

•

Approving the remuneration of the chief audit executive.

•

Making appropriate inquiries of management and the chief audit
executive to determine whether there are inappropriate scope or
resource limitations.

Yes

* Blank means the respective independence required is missing in the governance code.

As there is no regulatory requirement about internal audit independence, one should not
be surprised that internal audit functions are positioned differently depending on organizations.
Bariff (2003) argues that internal audit independence is at risk when the CAEs are appointed or
dismissed by their audit clients. McHugh and Raghunandan (1994) found that vesting the CAE
appointment authority with the audit committee would enhance internal audit independence.
Gwilliam and Kilcommins (1998) suggested that the vast majority of internal audit functions
(IAF) in organizations with an audit committee presence would be perceived enhanced.
12

Gramling Coram 2004) conducted a series of in-depth interviews of internal auditors and
audit committee (AC) members and concluded that ACs might elevate internal auditors' status in
the organizations and enhance their objectivity and independence. He argued that a quality
relationship between the audit committee and the IAF provides the IAF with a better support
system in fulfilling its activities. Turley and Zaman (2007) did similar interviews with a large
UK financial services company and suggested that an AC can set a tone at the top that allows the
internal audit to have appropriate authority and influence in the organization. Christopher et al.
(2009) sampled 34 Australian companies to examine internal audit independence. With the focus
of the IAFs’ relationships with AC and management, the researchers identified several threats to
the audit independence, such as CAEs not reporting functionally to the AC, the AC not
responsible for appointing and evaluating the CAE.
Arena and Azzone (2007) and Lenz and Sarens(2012) argue that effective IAFs might
have helped Enron’s scancel and Lehman Brothers’ failure. Ronkko, Paananen, and Vakkuri
(2018) argue that less than half of companies voluntarily choose to establish an internal audit
function, even though the internal audit function provides significant value to improve the
organization’s governance processes (Coram et al, 2008), and detect fraud (Ege, 2015).
Whether an internal audit function is required in an organization depends on the
respective regulatory requirements governing the organization. Stock exchanges around the
world created their own governing rules regarding internal audit mandate. Not all regulations
require their publicly traded companies to have internal audit functions. German and Japanese
governance codes require publicly listed companies to establish an internal audit function. The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the US have the same mandate for its publicly-traded
companies. Its mandate also includes an internal audit function providing assurance services
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through ongoing assessments of the company's risk management systems and internal control
processes. However, publicly-traded companies on the NASDAQ Stock Market LLC are not
required to establish and maintain an internal audit function.
Braiotta (1999) research concluded that the CAE meetings with the audit committee in an
executive session would protect and enhance the independence of the internal audit function.
Drent (2002) indicates that in the minds of many executives and managers, internal auditors
work for them, management does not always appreciate the need for internal audit independence,
and the CAE’s reporting to the audit committee is merely a formality to comply with corporate
governance requirements.
In this paper, I test the following hypotheses:
•

H1: The board structures impact internal audit independence.

•

H2: Internal audit functions in organizations with an audit committee have higher levels of
independence than internal audit functions in organizations without an audit committee.

•

H3: Internal audit functions that are mandated by law have higher levels of independence
than internal audit functions that are not mandated by law.

•

H4a: Internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more likely to have
support from the board.

•

H4b: Internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more likely to have
a sufficient budget.

•

H4c: Internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more likely to have
complete and unrestricted access to the organization’s property and records.

•

H4d: CAEs from internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more
likely to meet with the audit committee in executive sessions.
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•

H4e: Internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more likely to
conform with the standard 2600 (communicating unacceptable risks to the board).

•

H5a: The board structures have an impact on the board's support to IAFs.

•

H5b: The board structures have an impact on the sufficiency of IAFs’ budget.

•

H5c: The board structures have an impact on the IAFs’ complete and unrestricted access to
the organization's property and records.

•

H5d: The board structures have an impact on whether CAEs meeting with the audit
committee in executive sessions

•

H5e: The board structures have an impact on the IAFs’ conformance with the standard 2600
(communicating unacceptable risks to the board).

15

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA

3.1 Research Method
Quantitative research objectively tests theories by investigating the relationships among
variables that are statistically analyzed to conclude (Creswell, 2009 and2017). Following
Creswell’s methodology, the study investigates the factors impacting internal audit independence
and how the internal audit independence is reflected in the actual practice.

3.2 Data Collection and Sampling
Once every five years, the IIA commissions a survey of the internal audit professionals.
The Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) study is by far the world's largest study of the
internal audit profession. This comprehensive survey contains detailed questions about various
issues ranging from the characteristics of participating organizations, their internal audit
function, and individual internal auditors and their practices. The most recent 2015 CBOK study
was offered in 23 languages with participation from 14,500 practitioners from 166
countries/territories. The survey results provide a comprehensive overview of how the internal
audit profession is practiced and potential changes in the future.
I identify several CBOK survey questions and responses about the variables related to the
investigation of the governance, internal audit independence, and internal audit practices. Only
responses from CAEs are selected for the analysis of the study to ensure that each participating
company has only one representative response from its head of internal audit function. To
identify whether the three different types of board structure is a factor impacting internal audit
16

independence, I selected five countries representing these models, the US representing one-tier
board country, Germany and Austria for two-tier board countries, Japan and China for the hybrid
model countries. Though a number of countries, such as France, Spain, and the Netherlands,
adopt a two-tier board structure, they also allow one-tier board.
Because the governance structure can be different among publicly traded companies,
private companies, and government and public sector entities even within the same country, I
focus only on publicly traded companies. As publicly traded companies in the five sample
countries are required to follow their countries’ security exchange laws or governance codes, it is
reasonable to assume that the listed organizations in the US adopt one-tier board structure, the
listed organizations in Austria and Germany have two-tiers boards, and the listed organizations
in China and Japan have the hybrid board model.
However, due to the small number of responses from CAEs of German and Austrian
publicly traded companies, I added privately traded companies from these two countries to
increase the sample size. Though publicly-traded companies and private limited companies in
Germany follow different acts, there is a mandatory requirement in the German corporate law
that requires the separation of a supervisory board, a management board for stock corporations,
and large limited liability companies (Baums, 1999). Additionally, the results of a sequence of
Mann–Whitney U test revealed that there is no significant difference in internal audit
independence distribution between privately held and publicly traded organizations in Germany
(p = 0.237) and Austria (p = 0.999).
After going through the above filtering process, I selected a total of 393 CAEs responses
from 5 countries for this research. Table 2 below shows the smaple from the five countries.
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Table 2. Summary of selected sample responses
Board

Country

Publicly traded

One-tier board

US

178

Two-tiers board

Germany

17

Austria

3

Japan

81

China

47

Hybrid board

Total

Privately traded

55
12

393 responses

Note for Japan – While this research focuses on the traditional Japanese governance
model, the Japanese Governance Code revised in 2015 allows two other types of governance
structures. However, at the time of the CBOK survey, (early 2015), 98.3% of the listed
companies in Japan adopted the traditional board model in Japan 1. It is, therefore, reasonable to
assume the responses from the CAEs of the Japanese listed companies adopted the hybrid
(traditional Japanese) model.

3.3 Research Variables
To investigate the factors that impact internal audit independence, whether and how the
internal audit independence is reflected in actual internal audit practice, I selected three sets of
test variables 1) internal audit independence, 2) factors that potentially impact internal audit
independence, and 3) internal audit practices related to its independence.

1

Tokyo Stock Exchange Listed Companies White Paper on Corporate Governance 2015)
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3.3.1 Internal audit independence (IAI)
In order to measure the independence of the internal audit function (IAI), I created a
proxy for the independence of the IAF based on the independence requirements set by the IIA’s
Standard 1110.
A. CAEReport – Whether the CAE functionally reports to the board, including approval of the
internal audit charter and the audit plan.
B. CAEAppointment – Whether the board approves the appointment and removal of the CAE.
C. CAEPerformace – Whether the board is responsible for the performance evaluation of the
CAE.
I selected three CBOK survey questions related to internal audit independence measures.
The following table shows these questions and how the CAE’s responses are computed into the
above three measures that comprise the internal audit independence variable – IAI (See Table3).
Table 3. Survey questions and responses pertaining to internal audit independence
Variable

CBOK Question

Variable Measure

CAEReport

Q74: What is the primary FUNCTIONAL
reporting line for the chief audit executive (CAE)
or equivalent in your organization?

1- Audit committee, or Board of
directors

CAEAppointment

Q75: Who makes the final decision for the
appointment of the chief audit executive (CAE) or
equivalent?

0 – others
1 - Board, or supervisory committee;
Chair of the board or supervisory
committee; Audit committee; Chair
of the audit committee
0 - others

CAEPerformace

Q76. Who is ultimately responsible for the
performance evaluation of the chief audit
executive (CAE), or head of internal audit, at your
organization?

1 - Board, or supervisory committee;
Chair of the board or supervisory
committee; Audit committee; Chair
of the audit committee
0 - others
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The IAI is then measured as the composite score of A, B, and C. IAI = CAEReport +
CARAppointment + CAEPerformance. The value of IAI ranges from 0 to 3. An IAF with the
maximum IAI score of three (3) would be considered the most independent, while an IAF with
the minimum IAI score of zero (0) would be considered the least independence.

3.3.2 Factors potentially impacting internal audit independence
The first research question aims to investigate the factors that impact internal audit
independence. I identify the following explanatory variables that are potentially associated with
the independence of an IAF. Though the primary research interest is whether the three
governance factors impact IAF independence, I include a number of other factors to ensure an
objective and broader investigation.
1) OrgBoard – Whether the organization adopts a one-tier, two-tier, or hybrid board structure.
The variable is calculated based on the country where the organization resides. I then classify
the five representative countries into one-tier board countries (coded as 1), two-tiers board
countries (coded as 2), and hybrid model countries (coded as 3) for the analysis.
2) OrgAC – Whether the organization has an Audit Committee.
3) IAMandate – Whether the internal audit function is mandated by law.
4) OrgIndustry – Industry which the organization belongs to.
5) OrgFTE – Total number of full-time equivalent staff (FTE) in the organization.
6) IAAge – Number of years that the internal audit function has been in place.
7) IAFTE - Number of full-time equivalent employees in the internal audit function.
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The following table shows the seven survey questions and how the responses to these
questions are computed into the seven independent variables that potentially impact the internal
audit independence (See Table 4).
Table 4. Potential factors impacting IAI and related survey questions and responses
Variable

CBOK Question

Variable Measure

OrgBoard

Q6: In which region are you based or primarily work?

1 – US (one-tier board)

Q6a: Select a country from the list of Africa countries

2 – Germany and Austria (twotiers board)

Q6b: Select a country from the list of Asia countries
Q6c: Select a country from the list of Pacific countries

3 – Japan and China (hybrid
board)

Q6d: Select a country from the list of European
countries
OrgAC

IAMandate

OrgIndustry

Q78: Is there an audit committee or equivalent in your
organization?

1 – Yes

Q68: Is the existence of an internal audit department
mandated by law for your organization?

1 – Yes

Q18: What is the primary industry classification(s) of
the organization for which you work?

Six categorical industries

0 – No

0 – No

1 - Financial & insurance
2 - Manufacturing
3 - Construction, utilities, mining,
oil, and gas
4 - Trade and transportation
5 - Information, professional and
technical service
6 - Others

OrgFTE

Q19. For the entire organization in which you work,
what was the approximate total number of full-time
equivalent employees as of the end of the last fiscal
year?

Actual number

IAAge

Q23: Approximately how many years has the internal
audit department been in place at your organization?

Actual number

IAFTE

Q24: Approximately how many full-time equivalent
employees make up your internal audit department?

Actual number
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3.3.3 Measures of internal audit practices
The second research question in this study is whether internal audit independence is
reflected in actual internal audit practices. The measures of actual internal audit practices
pertaining to audit independence are:
1) BoardSupport - The board of directors supports IAF to review the organization's governance
policies and procedures
2) IABudget – Whether the internal audit function’s annual budget is sufficient in carrying the
responsibilities
3) IAAccess - Whether internal audit function has complete and unrestricted access to
employees' property and records
4) CAEMeetAC - Whether the CAE meets with the audit committee in executive sessions with
no member of management present
5) IACommRisk - Whether internal audit function is in conformance with the Standard 2600 “Communicating the Acceptance of Risks - When the CAE concludes that management has
accepted a level of risk that may be unacceptable to the organization, the CAE must discuss
the matter with senior management. If the CAE determines that the matter has not been
resolved, the CAE must communicate the matter to the board” (The IIA, 2017, p. 20)
The following table shows the survey questions and how the responses to these questions are
computed into the five dependent variables representing internal audit practices pertaining to its
independence (See Table 5, page 23).

22

Table 5. Internal audit practices variables and related survey questions and responses
Variable

CBOK Question

Variable Measure

BoardSupport

Q67: In your opinion, how much support does internal
audit have from the board of directors (or equivalent) to
review the organization's governance policies and
procedures?

3- Complete support

IABudget

Q28: In your opinion, how sufficient is the funding for
your internal audit department relative to the extent of its
audit responsibilities?

2 - Some support
1 - No support
3 - Completely sufficient
2 - Somewhat sufficient
1 - Not at all sufficient

IAAccess

CAEMeetingAC

IACommRisks

Q53: In your opinion, to what extent does the internal
audit department at your organization has complete and
unrestricted access to employees' property and records as
appropriate for the performance of audit activities?
(CAEs only)
Q78c: Does the chief audit executive (CAE), or director,
meet at least once per year with the audit committee in
executive sessions with no member of management
present?
Q99: Is your organization in conformance with the
Standard 2600 – Communicating the Acceptance of
Risks?

4 - All of the time
3 - Most of the time
2 - Some of the time
1 - None of the time
1 - Yes
0 - No

3 - Full conformance
2 - Partial conformance
1 - Not in conformance

3.4 Research Concept Map
The following chart depicts a concept map that connects two research questions and all
variables in the two questions (See Figure 2, page 24). The diagram illustrates the potential
relationships of factors impacting internal audit independence and internal audit practice.
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Figure 2. Concept map of the research questions and variables
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CHAPTER FOUR: STATISTICAL ANALYSES ANS FINDINGS
The responses to the CBOK survey questions are filtered into the data set of the research.
All independent and dependent variables described in section 3.3 are then computed from the
raw data, stored and analyzed using SPSS Version 24.

4.1 Data Description
To answer the first research question, I selected the seven factors that may have a
potential impact on internal audit independence. These factors are organizational board structure
(OrgBoard), an audit committee existence in the organization (OrgAC), whether the internal
audit function is mandated by law (IAMandate), the industry to which the organization belongs
(OrgIndustry), the total number of employees of the organization (OrgFTE), the number of years
of the internal audit function (IAAge), as well as the number of full-time equivalent employees
in the internal audit function (IAFTE).
Among the seven factors, IAAge, IAFTE, and OrgFTE are continuous numbers. Due to
the high positive skew of the survey responses, the natural log transformation is utilized to
convert them into IAAge_LOG, IAFTE_LOG, and OrgFTE_LOG. As zero is not defined for the
natural logarithmic function, one response from IAAge and one response from IAFTE are
deleted during transformation. The individual deleted during IAFTE transformation is not the
same individual deleted during the IAAge transformation. Therefore, two separate individuals
were deleted due to transformations throughout the study.
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While reviewing the survey responses, I noticed several missing values. Reporting the
amount of data missing from among participants is important in considering potential
generalizability (Schlomer et al., 2010). The missing data related to the variables in the RQ1 is
listed in the table below (See Table 6). The total sample size is 393. I adopted the listwise
deletion model, where missing data are dropped from the analysis. After removing the missing
data, the total number of valid observations left to study the first research question is 255.
Table 6. Missing data related to RQ1 Variables
Missing

Valid Number

Percent

IAI

74

319

18.8%

OrgBoard

0

393

0

OrgAC

54

339

13.7%

IAMandate

59

334

15.0%

OrgIndustry

0

393

0

OrgFTE

1

392

0

IAFTE

21

372

5.3%

IAAge

64

329

16.3%

4.2 Factors Impacting IAI (RQ1)
The internal audit independence (IAI) variable is valued at 0, 1, 2, and 3. The distribution
of IAI is provided in Table 7, page 27. Approximately 19% of the sample corresponded to the
lowest IAI score - zero, while 37% corresponded to the highest IAI score. 62% of the internal
audit functions in the sample organizations did not meet the independence requirement set by IIA
Standards.
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Table 7. Distribution of Internal Audit Independence
IAI

Count

Percent

Cumulative Percent

0

48

18.8

18.8%

1

54

21.2

40.0%

2

56

22.0

62.0%

3

97

38.0

100.0%

255

100.0

100.0%

Total

In analyzing the distribution of the internal audit independence by country, it is obvious
that the IAI is not consistent across all countries(See Table 8). Among the 5 sample countries, a
higher proportion more IAFs in Austria and Germany (two-tier boards) have a higher level of
internal audit independence compared to the US, China, and Japan. The IAI in 54% of Japanese
internal audit functions and 32% of Chinese internal audit functions is 0, which means they did
not meet any of the internal audit independence requirements set by the IIA Standards.
Table 8. Distribution of Internal Audit Independence by Country
OrgCountry

IAI

0
1
2
3

US

Germany

Austria

Japan

China

Count

7

7

0

26

8

% within Country

5.8%

13.7%

0.0%

54.2%

Count

24

8

0

18

% within Country

20.0%

15.7%

0.0%

37.5%

Count

36

12

2

% within Country

30.0%

23.5%

Count

53

24

% within Country

44.2%

47.1%

120

51

Total Count

18.2%

48

32.0%
4

3

Total

18.8%
54

16.0%
3

21.2%
56

6.3%

12.0%

22.0%

1

10

97

81.8%

2.1%

40.0%

38.0%

11

48

25

255

9
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Two other important elements of corporate governance are whether organizations have
an audit committee (OrgAC) and whether IAF is mandated by law (IAMandate). Table 9 shows
the distribution of OrgAC and board type. 20% of the sample organizations do not have an audit
committee. 100% of the sample organizations in the US with the one-tier board have an audit
committee. The percentage of OrgAC dropped significantly; only 68.5% of the hybrid board
organizations and 53% of the two-tier board organizations have an Audit Committee.
Table 9. Sample distribution by Audit Committee presence and board type
OrgBoard
OrgAC

Total
One-tier

Count

Two-tiers

Hybrid

0

29

23

52

0.0%

46.8%

31.5%

20.4%

120

33

50

203

100.0%

53.2%

68.5%

79.6%

120

62

73

255

No
% within OrgBoard
Count
Yes
% within OrgBoard
Total

Count

Table 10 shows the distribution of IAMandate and board type. 57% of the sample internal
audit functions are mandated by law.
Table 10. Sample distribution by internal audit mandate and board type
OrgBoard
Total

IAMandate

No
Yes

Total

One-tier

Two-tiers

Hybrid

Count

34

37

38

109

% within OrgBoard

28.3%

59.7%

52.1%

42.7%

Count

86

25

35

146

% within OrgBoard

71.7%

40.3%

47.9%

57.3%

Count

120

62

73

255
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Internal audit mandate is not a consistent requirement in the three types of board
structure, but more organizations with one-tier board require internal audit functions than other
types of organizations.
The study groups the 255 sample organizations into six industries, shown in the
descriptive statistics table below (See Table 11). Overall, 35% of the sample organizations are
from the manufacturing industry, and 22% from the financial and insurance industry. The CAEs
from the financial and insurance industry provided the most responses in the US, while IAFs in
the manufacturing industry provided the most responses in the other four sample countries.
These numbers correspond with the overall IIA membership.
Table 11. Sample distribution by industry and board type
OrgBoard
Total
Industry

% of Total

One-Tier

Two-Tiers

Hybrid

1 - Financial & insurance

37

16

3

56

22.0%

2 - Manufacturing

26

25

39

90

35.3%

3 - Construction, utilities, mining,
oil, and gas

22

4

8

34

13.3%

4 - Trade and transportation

15

3

12

30

11.8%

5 - Information, professional &
technical service

3

7

4

14

5.5%

6 - Others

17

7

7

31

12.1%

120

62

73

255

100%

Total

Table 12, on page 30, presents summary statistics on key characteristics of our sample
organizations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 12. Sample distribution by industry and board type
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Min

Max

IAI

255

1.792

2.000

1.143

0.000

3.000

OrgAC

255

0.800

1.000

0.404

0.000

1.000

IAMandate

255

0.570

1.000

0.496

0.000

1.000

OrgFTE_LOG

255

7.657

8.006

2.213

0.690

12.61

IAAge_LOG

255

2.514

2.485

0.904

0.000

4.380

IAFTE_LOG

255

1.873

1.791

1.117

0.000

5.520

•

The mean and median of internal audit independence in the sample organizations are close,
being 1.8 and 2, respectively. The standard deviation reveals that the IAI values are widely
spread as more than 50% of the IAI values fall outside one standard deviation from the
mean.

•

The mean and median of the OrgAC are close, being 0.8 and 1, respectively. The standard
deviation reveals that the OrgAC values are closely grouped as about 80% of the OrgAC
values fall inside one standard deviation of the mean.

•

The mean and median of the IAMandate are far; they are 0.57 and 1, respectively. The
standard deviation reveals that the IAMandate values are spread out as about 43% of the
IAMandate values fall outside one standard deviation of the mean.
The board structure is a significant element of corporate governance. To further analyze

whether and how OrgBoard impacts IAI, OrgAC, IAMandate, OrgFEE, IAAge, and IAFTE, I
conducted a number of T-tests. Being a type of inferential statistics, the T-test is a univariate
hypothesis test and an appropriate way in determining whether there is a significant difference
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between the means of two groups. The following table shows a summary of the comparison
based on board types (See Table 13).
Table 13. Comparison of Sample Organizations’ Mean based on the type of Board Structure
OrgBoard

IAI

OrgAC

IAMandate

OrgFTE_LOG

IAAge_LOG

IAFTE_LOG

1

2

N=120

N=62

2.125

2.177

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.000

0.532

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.72

0.40

(0.000)

(0.043)

7.733

7.656

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.605

2.525

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.182

1.394

(0.000)

(0.000)

T-Test
-0.33

7.32**

4.17**

0.21

0.50

5.13**

1

3

N=120

N=73

2.125

0.918

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.000

0.685

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.72

0.48

(0.000)

(0.000)

7.733

7.531

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.605

2.348

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.182

1.743

(0.000)

(0.000)

T-Test
7.748***

5.75***

3.30**

0.65

2.21**

2.73**

2

3

N=62

N=73

2.177

0.918

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.532

0.685

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.40

0.48

(0.043)

(0.000)

7.656

7.531

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.525

2.348

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.394

1.743

(0.000)

(0.000)

T-Test
6.87***

1.81*

-0.89

0.32

1.11

1.95**

Variables are defined in Chapter 3.3
P-values are based on two-tailed tests.
* The T-test with significant effects (p<.01).
** The T-test with significant effects (p<.05).
*** The T-test with significant effects (p<.001).
•

IAI – there is a significant difference in internal audit independence between one-tier board
organizations and hybrid board organizations (p<.001); also, there is a significant difference
in internal audit independence between two-tier board organizations and hybrid board
organizations (p<0.001). The means of internal audit independence in organizations with the
one-tier board and two-tier board are much higher than those with the hybrid board.
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However, there is no significant difference in the audit independence between organizations
with a one-tier board and two-tier board.
•

OrgAC – there is a statically significant difference among the three board types in terms of
whether organizations have an audit committee, with one-tier organizations having the
highest mean, followed by hybrid organizations, then two-tier organizations.

•

IAMandate – in terms of IAF mandates, there is a statically significant difference between
one-tier and two-tier, one-tier, and hybrid organizations, with IAFs in one-tier board
organization having the highest mean of internal audit mandate. However, there are no
differences between the two-tier and hybrid board organizations.

•

IAFTE – there is a statically significant difference in terms of the number of employees in
IAFs, with one-tier organizations having the highest mean, followed by hybrid, then two-tier
organizations.

•

IAAge - in terms of the number of years since IAFs established, there is a statically
significant difference between one-tier and hybrid organizations, with IAFs in one-tier board
organization having higher mean than those in the hybrid board organization. There is no
significant difference between one-tier and two-tiers, two-tiers, and hybrid organizations.

•

OrgFTE – there is no significant difference between the three board types in terms of the
number of employees in the organizations.
I adopted the linear regression to investigate the first research question - which of the

seven independent variables (OrgBoard, OrgAC, IAMandate, OrgIndustry, OrgFTE, IAAge, and
IAFTE) have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable (IAI). Prior to estimating
the regression analysis. I conducted a multi-collinearity test to ensure that I do not have two or
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more independent variables that are highly correlated with each other. This is an important test as
multi-collinearity may lead to problems with understanding which independent variable
contributes to the dependent variable, as well as technical issues in calculating a multiple
regression model. I conducted the collinearity analysis, and all Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
values are between 1 and 3. It is reasonable to assume that this data set has no multicollinearity
problem.
The following table shows the output of the regression model of internal audit
independence (IAI) as the dependent variable (See Table 14, page 34). The IAI is a continuous
variable that ranges from 0 to 3, with increasing scores indicating higher IAF independence. As
only one industry (financial and insurance) has a potential impact on IA, the model controls for
industries with industry fixed effects. Also, I suppressed the intercept in the regression model in
order to explicitly estimate the coefficient of all three board types.
The high R2 and adjusted R2 indicate that it is a strong regression model, and the
independent variables in the model have a large size of the effect on IAI. The results show that
the effects of OrgBoard and IAMandate on IAI are significant (p<0.05). I have sufficient support
to the H1 - The board structures impact internal audit independence, and H3 - Internal audit
functions that are mandated by law have higher levels of independence than internal audit
functions that are not mandated by law. The one-tier board and two tiers-board structures have
statistically highly significant effects on internal audit independence (P<0.001). Hybrid board
has an effect on IAI, but its evidence is not as strong as one-tier and two-tiers organizations
(p<0.01).
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As the p value for OrgAC is 0.745, I reject the H2 - Internal audit functions in
organizations with an audit committee have higher levels of independence than internal audit
functions in organizations without an audit committee.
Table 14. Variables impacting internal audit independence
IAI – Internal Audit Independence
Coefficient

t.

P>|t|

OrgBoard_DUM1

1.593

4.32

<.0001***

OrgBoard_DUM2

1.868

5.09

<.0001***

OrgBoard_DUM3

0.689

1.95

0.052**

OrgAC

0.058

0.33

0.745

IAMandate

0.362

-2.65

0.009**

OrgFTE_LOG

0.039

1.18

0.241

IAAge_LOG

0.061

0.78

0.439

IAFTE_LOG

-0.002

-0.02

0.980

OrgIndustry_DUM1

0.416

1.72

0.086*

Industry Fixed Effects

Y

N

255

R2

0.8009

Adjusted R2

0.7902

F test: OrgBoard 1= OrgBoard 2

F=2.15

P>|F|=0.144

F test: OrgBoard 1= OrgBoard 3

F=30.14

P>|F|=<.0001***

F test: OrgBoard 2= OrgBoard 3

F=41.80

P>|F|=<.0001***

Variables are defined in Section 3.3
* Independent variable with significant effects on IAI. (p<.01).
** Independent variable with significant effects on IAI. (p<.05).
*** Independent variable with significant effects on IAI. (p<.001).
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Additionally, one of the OrgIndustry (Finance & Insurance industry) has significant
effects on the IAI. All other predictors (the age of the IAF, and the number of employees in the
organization and the internal audit function) do not have significant effects on internal audit
independence.
I ran three F-tests to compare the equality of three different board types. As the p-value is
less than 0.001, I concluded that there is a significant difference in internal audit independence
between organizations with a one-tier board and hybrid board, also between organizations with a
two-tier board and hybrid board. As the p-value is 0.144, internal audit independence in
organizations with the one-tier board is indifferent as a two-tier board.
In terms of IAMandate, the coefficient value is 0.362, and the p-value is less than 0.05.
This means that the internal audit mandate has significant effects on IAI. All other things being
equal, when the internal audit is mandated by law, IAFs have 0.362 higher levels of
independence than those IAFs without the mandate.
In terms of OrgIndustry, the coefficient is 0.416, and the p-value is less than 0.01. This
means that the financial and insurance industry has significant effects on IAI. All other things
being equal, IAFs in the financial and insurance industry have 0.416 higher levels of
independence than other industries.
In summary, two out of the three governance factors - OrgBoard and IAMandate, have an
impact on internal audit independence. Internal audit independence is highly related to board
types. One-tier and two-tier board organizations have higher level internal audit independence
than a hybrid board. There is no significant difference between a one-tier and two-tier board. The
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internal audit functions mandated by law have a higher level of independence than those without
such a mandate.

4.3 Actual Internal Audit Practices (RQ2)
The aim of the second research question is to review whether the IAI measure is reflected
in the actual internal audit practices. The 5 dependent variables selected pertaining internal audit
practices are 1) whether the board supports internal audit function (BoardSupport), 2) whether
internal audit function has sufficient budget and 3) unrestricted access to conduct its work
(IABudget and IAAccess), 4) whether CAE meets with AC in an executive session
(CAEMeetingAC), and 5) whether CAE communicates unacceptable risks (IACommRisks).
Using each of the above five measurements as the dependent variable, and IAI,
OrgBoard, OrgAC IAMandate, OrgIndustry, OrgFTE, IAAge, and IAFTE as the independent
variables, I ran the regression analysis in SPSS. All of the five regression models are statistically
significant, with p-value is less than 0.001. The following table shows the results summary of the
coefficients between each of the dependent variables and independent variables and their
significance (See Table 15, page 37). Since OrgBoard is a polytomous variable with three values
(1, 2, and 3), the following results used OrgBoard=3 (hybrid board) as the reference.
I have sufficient evidence to support the five hypotheses - H4a, H4b, H4c, H4d, and H4e.
Origination board types have a statistically significant effect on all internal audit practices board support, IA budget, IA free access to organization records, CAE meeting AC in private
session, and IA communicating unacceptable risks.
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Table 15. Summary of Coefficients of IVs on DVs
BoardSupport
(N=248)

IABudget
(N=254)

IAAccess
(N=248)
Sig.
(p)

Coefficien
t

Sig.
(p)

IACommRisks
(N=200)

Coeffici
ent

Sig.
(p)

Coeffi
cient

Sig.
(p)

IAI

0.16***

0.000

0.12**

0.002

0.10*

0.031

0.017

0.520

-0.02

0.545

OrgBoard_
DUM1

0.35***

0.001

0.21*

0.039

0.74***

0.000

0.253***

0.000

0.47***

0.000

OrgBoard_
DUM2

0.36**

0.002

0.36**

0.003

0.60***

0.000

-0.365***

0.000

0.48***

0.000

0.23*

0.027

-0.06

0.552

0.09

0.497

+++

+++

0.06

0.577

IAMandate

0.07

0.371

0.11

0.195

0.12

0.245

-0.041

0.443

0.10

0.234

OrgFTE_L
OG

0.00

0.878

-0.03

0.117

0.03

0.264

0.009

0.469

0.01

0.474

IAAge_LO
G

-0.06

0.161

0.05

0.273

0.00

0.994

-0.024

0.452

0.00

0.949

IAFTE_LO
G

0.07

0.089

0.11**

0.014

0.00

0.958

0.009

0.755

0.09*

0.042

OrgIndustr
y_DUM1

-0.04

0.771

0.01

0.955

0.06

0.750

0.101

0.272

0.10

0.480

OrgIndustr
y_DUM2

0.03

0.781

0.16

0.183

0.17

0.246

0.101

0.203

-0.03

0.797

OrgIndustr
y_DUM3

0.12

0.370

0.07

0.651

0.18

0.316

-0.024

0.800

0.14

0.349

OrgIndustr
y_DUM4

-0.03

0.829

0.14

0.355

0.04

0.846

0.171

0.087

0.12

0.446

OrgIndustr
y_DUM5

0.40*

0.026

0.42*

0.027

0.00

0.995

-0.065

0.639

0.32

0.091

OrgAC

Coeffici
ent

CAEMeetingAC
(N=195)

Coeffici
ent

Sig.
(p)

Variables are defined in Chapter 3.3
* Statistically significant (p<.01).
** Statistically significant (p<.05)
*** Statistically significant (p<.001).
+++ For model with dependent variable CAEMeetingAC, the OrgAC variable is constant or has missing
correlations. It was deleted from the analysis.
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Internal audit functions in organizations with one-tier board enjoy higher levels of board
support, budget, free access to the company’s records, and communicating risks than those in
organizations with the hybrid board. Internal audit functions in organizations with a two-tier
board enjoy higher levels of board support, budget, free access to the company’s records, and
communicating risks than those in organizations with the hybrid board.
In order to compare one-tier with two-tiers, I re-ran the regression models with dummy
variable OrgBoard_DUM1 (one-tier board) as the reference. There is no statistically significant
difference between the effect of the one-tier board and two-tier board on four out of the five
dependent variables - board support, IA budget, IA free access to organization records, and IA
communicating unacceptable risks (p-value > 0.05). However, CAEs in organizations with the
one-tier board have more private meetings of the AC than those in two-tier board and hybrid
board organizations. This could explain why 100% of sample organizations with the one-tier
board have AC, while only 53% in two-tier organizations have AC.
Internal audit independence index has a positive and statistically significant effect on
three out of five internal audit practices selected for the research - board support, IA budget, and
IA free access to records. I have sufficient evidence to support the five hypotheses – H5a, H4b,
H5c, but not H5d or H5e. Additionally, as the coefficients of OrgBoard on the five dependent
variables are much higher than IAI, the effects of OrgBoard on IA practices are much higher
than IAI.
OrgAC has a positive and statistically significant effect on board support. IAFTE has a
positive and statistically significant effect on internal audit budget and IA communicating
unacceptable risks. Information, professional, and technical service industries have a positive and
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statistically significant effect on BoardSupport and IABudget than other industries. IAMandate,
OrgFTE, and IAAge have no effect on any of the five dependent variables.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Internal audit functions provide assurance of the effectiveness of all business functions in
the company and proactively focuses on creating added value for the company. However, the
realization of their strategic role depends on the internal audit function’s independence and
internal auditors’ objectivity. (Dordevic, 2017).
Though the IIA Standards require that internal audit functions be independent in
performing its duties, CAEs report to the board and internal auditors have direct and unrestricted
access to senior management and the board, and etc., the research shows that these minimum
requirements are not conformed by internal audit functions around the world.
The complexity of corporate governance creates variances in board structures. The study
reveals that the organization’s board structure is a significant factor impacting internal audit
independence and internal audit practices. Internal audit practices are positively associated with
internal audit independence.
Creswell (2009) defines a theory as a collection of interrelated variables made up of
proposals or hypotheses, indicating the connection among these variables in terms of direction
and magnitude. Through this research, I am able to test the following theories:
•

The type of board structure does have an impact on the actual internal audit practices.

•

The type of board structure does have an impact on the actual internal audit practices,
e.g., board support of internal audit functions, internal audit function’s budget and access
to organization’s records, internal audit communicating unacceptable risks to the audit
committee or board, and CAE meeting with audit committee in executive session.
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•

Internal audit functions that are mandated by law are more likely to be independent than
those opposite.

•

Internal audit functions that have higher levels of independence are more likely to be
supported by the board, have sufficient budget, and unrestricted access to the
organization’s records.

However, contrary to most research thus far, I find no support for the hypothesis that the
internal audit functions in organizations with an audit committee have a higher level of
independence than those without the committee. This could be because the researchers’ focus has
been within one country where governance models are similar.
The chart below depicts the theoretical perspective concluded from the research.

Figure 3. Theoretical map pertaining to internal audit independence

From a practice perspective, an internal audit function serves as the agent of the board.
Internal audit independence from management is a pre-requisite to provide assurance on the
organization’s risk management and internal control processes. To some extent, the CAE’s
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relationship with the board determines the positioning of the internal audit function, reinforces
the authority of the function, and can have a significant impact on its effectiveness. The results of
this research provide the IIA, regulators, management, boards, and investors with three
representative governance models and their board structures, CAE reporting relationship with the
board, and how board structures impact internal audit independence and practices. In order to
have effective corporate governance, at minimum, the Governance Codes need to be updated to
clearly specify internal audit function’s authorities and responsibilities in an organization and
ensure CAE reports to an independent board. The conclusion of this study also makes a
suggestion that all market regulators need to consider making internal audit mandatory.
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CHAPTER SIX: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES
I base the research on the CBOK 2015 data, which also becomes a limitation of the
research. The 2015 CBOK study did not give much consideration to the different governance
structures around the world, such as separating the management board and the supervisory board,
the existence of an audit committee in some countries. The survey was designed based on a pure
Anglo-American corporate governance model. I could not find any evidence that the two-tier or
a different board structure was considered or included in the survey design.
The data from the sample organizations in the US demonstrates that 100% of CAEs
report to the audit committee, a subset of the board of directors. However, one should not
automatically assume that CAEs from countries with the two-tier board, such as Germany,
responded that they report to an independent board – the supervisory board. In fact, scholars like
Eulerich (2013) state that in Germany, internal auditors functionally report to the management
board, while sharing information with the supervisory board. In the two-tier system, the IAF is
considered as an agent of the management board. The management board is responsible for the
establishment and maintenance of IA. Considering the management board in Germany is
equivalent to senior management in US companies, the CAE functionally reporting to the
management board does not enhance internal audit independence.
On the other hand, besides the functional reporting relationship between CAEs and the
board, the IIA Standards also require that CAEs administratively report to senior management
within the organizations. The responses to the CBOK survey reveal that the majority of CAEs in
Japan report to CEOs both functionally and administratively. At the time of the CBOK survey,
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84% of presidents/CEOs of the listed companies in Japan also served as the chairman of the
board. CAEs functionally and administratively reporting to CEOs in Japan may not necessarily
impair IAF independence.
The various internal audit positions within organizations and CAE’s reporting
relationship with the board are illustrated in the chart below (See Figure 4).

Figure 4. Internal audit’s position in organizations

Corporate governance sets the tone, directions, and strategy of the organizations; it could
impact every decision making and execution process of the organizations. To truly understand
how internal audit independence is impacted by corporate governance, future research is needed
within the real-world context. I plan to adopt a case study methodology by Yin & Davis (2007),
assuming that such an understanding is likely to involve important contextual conditions
pertinent to the case. The plan is to select a number of publicly listed companies in the
representative countries, and interview the CAEs, board members and senior management to
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gain an understanding of the company’s governance model, board structure, the actual CAE’s
reporting relationship with the board, and how internal audit interacts with other governance
players and internal audit independence. Due to the prevalent impacts of governance to the
organizations, the study may potentially uncover other factors impacting internal audit
independence and internal audit practices.
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